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David L. Callies, faicp; Leigh Anne King, aicp; James C. Nicholas; and Cecily Talbert Barclay
The current surplus of housing should 
not disguise the fact that there is a 
chronic national affordable housing 
supply crisis. Aside from building 
public housing with decidedly mixed 
success, local governments have ad-
dressed the problem by means of man-
datory affordable housing set-asides 
for new construction or the application 
of affordable housing fees to private 
developments during the land use en-
titlement process. However, measures 
meant to address the dearth of afford-
able housing have struggled in the 
courts, which have repeatedly pointed 
to three flaws in these programs: a lack 
of local authority, a lack of nexus be-
tween the proposed development and 
the need for affordable housing, and 
affordable housing requirements dis-
proportionate to the need created by 
the development project.
LoCaL authority under State Law
Local government’s authority to impose 
affordable housing requirements de-
pends on state legislative and common 
law. Though this is a diverse area of 
state law, four clear themes emerge, two 
governed primarily by targeted state 
legislation, and two by court interpreta-
tions of general enabling legislation.
A few states have taken strong legisla-
tive positions prohibiting or protecting 
local involvement in affordable housing. 
For example, Hawaii’s impact fee statute, 
Hawaii Revised Statutes §§ 46-141 to 148, 
does not apply to housing linkage fees, 
and, indeed, expressly excludes such fees 
zoning powers granted. By contrast, a 
Virginia court has ruled that Arlington 
County lacks the authority to include a 
requirement that a developer provide 
affordable housing as part of the land 
development process at the zoning 
stage and also lacks the authority to re-
quire an affordable housing contribution 
as part of the site plan approval process. 
In Kansas-Lincoln, L.C. v. Arlington 
County Board,3 the court found that the 
requirement was outside the legislative 
authority granted to Arlington County 
by the Virginia General Assembly and 
was, therefore, illegal and invalid.4 The 
court was persuaded that if the General 
Assembly wanted counties to have such 
powers it would have specifically in-
cluded that grant of power in the act. 
This decision accords with an earlier 
decision, again from Virginia, in Board 
of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enterprises.5 
There, Fairfax County amended its zon-
ing ordinance to require “the developer 
of fifty or more dwelling units in [sev-
eral] zoning districts to commit himself, 
before rezoning or site plan approval to 
build at least 15 percent of these dwell-
ing units as low and moderate income 
housing. . . .”6 The trial court found 
that the amendment was invalid on the 
grounds that the Board of Supervisors 
exceeded its authority under the State’s 
zoning enabling act, the amendment 
was an improper delegation of legisla-
tive authority, and the amendment was 
arbitrary and capricious. On appeal, the 
Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with 
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from the authority granted to Hawaii’s 
four counties to levy impact fees for public 
facilities. Conversely, only a few states—
mainly California, Massachusetts, and 
New Jersey—specifically legislate for local 
inclusionary housing programs, though 
more than half the states require or pro-
vide for some measure of affordable hous-
ing, often in the form of comprehensive 
planning requirements to meet regional 
housing needs.2 
Most local government powers derive 
from state enabling legislation. In such 
states, the power to require mandatory 
housing set-asides would need to be del-
egated, and even some home-rule states 
might require such authority depending 
upon the theory of home rule in that par-
ticular state. The general language of the 
majority of state enabling statutes leaves 
open to debate the ability of local gov-
ernments to mandate affordable housing 
through the zoning process.
State courts have taken different 
approaches in applying these enabling 
statutes to local affordable housing 
programs, with many state courts inter-
preting broadly worded enabling acts 
to permit affordable housing exactions 
and impact fees as part of the general 
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The court related at some length what the City of Sacramento 
did to establish the “substantial connection between the 
development and the problem” of affordable housing.
[T]he zoning enabling act does not au-
thorize the governing body of a county 
to control compensation for the use of 
lands or the improvements thereon . . . . 
The amendment . . . exceeds the author-
ity granted by the enabling act to the 
local governing body because it is socio-
economic zoning and attempts to control 
the compensation for the use of land and 
the improvements thereon . . . . Of greater 
importance, however, is that the amend-
ment requires the developer or owner 
to rent or sell 15 percent of the dwelling 
units in the development to persons of 
low or moderate income at rental or sale 
prices not fixed by a free market . . . .7
Though not as often discussed as the 
constitutional questions surrounding ex-
actions and impact fees, state law is the 
first line of inquiry for a local official craft-
ing an affordable housing requirement, 
particularly given this wide range of state 
legislative and judicial approaches. 
nexuS
Local governments seeking to ensure con-
struction of affordable housing by develop-
ers have also run afoul of the requirement 
that there be a rational nexus between the 
proposed development and the affordable 
housing requirement imposed to avoid a 
constitutional takings claim. 
The scant precedent for imposing set-
aside requirements requires that the local 
government do so only when providing 
a series of meaningful bonuses to help 
offset the cost of the mandatory affordable 
housing set-asides.8 As noted in a standard 
treatise on land use, “There is some au-
thority for the use of set-asides and other 
housing exactions and fees to provide 
needed low income housing, but whether 
this is a sufficient basis for nexus, let alone 
proportionality, to stave off a constitutional 
challenge, is not clear.”9 Indeed, as an-
other treatise observes, when “provision 
of lower income housing is not linked to 
housing subsidies, zoning incentives may 
be necessary to absorb losses incurred by 
the developer on the lower-income units. 
Density bonuses are a possibility, and the 
ordinance can also relax site development 
requirements.”10
As to the imposition of fees on 
residential and nonresidential develop-
ment, local governments must demon-
strate that the development generates a 
need for such housing, generally of the 
workforce variety.11 
As one commentator recently 
noted in the commercial development 
context:
A number of cities have adopted exac-
tion programs that require downtown 
office and commercial developers to 
provide housing for lower-income 
groups or to a municipal fund for the 
construction of such housing. [Such] 
programs satisfy the nexus test only if 
the municipality can show that down-
town development contributes to the hous-
ing problem the linkage exaction is intended 
to remedy.12 
The Supreme Court’s “essential 
nexus” test was introduced in Nollan 
v. California Coastal Commission.13 The 
New Jersey Supreme Court described 
the Supreme Court’s test in terms of 
linkage: “The broad concept of linkage 
describes any of a wide range of munici-
pal regulations that condition the grant 
of development approval on the pay-
ment of funds to help finance services 
and facilities needed as a result of de-
velopment.”14 Explaining the relevance 
of linkage in a commercial development 
context, the court said, “In the context 
of developing affordable housing, link-
age refers to any scheme that requires 
developers to mitigate the adverse ef-
fects of non-residential development 
upon the shortage of housing either in-
directly, by contributing to an affordable 
housing trust fund, or directly, by actu-
ally constructing affordable housing.”15 
Under Nollan, “a permit condition 
that serves the same legitimate police-
power purpose as a refusal to issue the 
permit should not be found to be a 
taking if the refusal to issue the permit 
would not constitute a taking.”16 In ad-
dition, under Nollan, the government 
bears the burden of proving this nexus.17 
In the context of affordable housing fees 
in particular, fees satisfy this test “only 
if the municipality can show that down-
town development contributes to the 
housing problem18 the linkage exaction 
is intended to remedy.” Thus, Nollan’s 
nexus test applies to linkage fees. 
For example, in Commercial Builders 
of Northern California. v. Sacramento,19 
the Ninth Circuit considered an or-
dinance that imposed an affordable 
housing “fee in connection with the 
issuance of permits for nonresidential 
development of the type that will gen-
erate jobs.”20 Plaintiffs challenged the 
ordinance directly on Nollan grounds: 
lack of nexus or connection between 
the development and the affordable 
housing condition. The court upheld 
the ordinance under Nollan, reasoning 
that, “Nollan holds that where there is 
no evidence of a nexus between the 
development and the problem that the 
exaction seeks to address, the exaction 
cannot be upheld.”21 The court then 
explained that “the [o]rdinance was 
implemented only after a detailed study 
revealed a substantial connection be-
tween development and the problem to 
be addressed . . . ”22
The court related at some length 
what the City of Sacramento did to 
establish the “substantial connection 
between the development and the 
problem” of affordable housing. First, 
it commissioned a study of the need for 
low-income housing, the effect of non-
residential development on the demand 
for such housing, and the appropriate-
ness of exacting fees in conjunction 
with such developments to pay for 
housing. The study: 
Estimat[ed] the percentage of new 
workers in the developments that would 
qualify as low income workers and 
would require housing. [The study] also 
calculated fees for development. . . . Also 
as instructed, however, in the interest 
of erring on the side of conservatism in 
exacting the fees, it reduced the final 
calculation by about one-half. Based 
upon this study, the City of Sacramento 
enacted the Housing Trust Fund Ordi-
nance [which] . . . included the finding 
that nonresidential development is ‘a 
major factor in attracting new employees 
to the region’ and that the influx of new 
employees ‘creates a need for additional 
housing in the City.’ Pursuant to these 
findings, the Ordinance imposes a fee in 
connection with the issuance of permits 
for nonresidential development of the 
type that will generate jobs.23
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 Consequently, the court found “that 
the nexus between the fee provision 
here at issue, designed to further the 
city’s legitimate interest in housing, 
and the burdens caused by commercial 
development is sufficient to pass consti-
tutional muster.”24
Even courts that decline to apply the 
heightened scrutiny of Nollan to legisla-
tively imposed fees nonetheless apply 
some form of Nollan’s essential nexus test. 
For instance, in San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City 
& County of San Francisco, 25 although the 
California Supreme Court reaffirmed that 
legislatively imposed, ministerial impact 
fees are not subject to the Nollan test, it 
nonetheless required that there “be a ‘rea-
sonable relationship’ between the fee and 
the deleterious impacts for the mitigation 
of which the fee is collected.”26 Similarly, 
in Holmdel Builders Association v. Township 
of Holmdel,27 although the Supreme Court 
of New Jersey concluded that legislative 
fees are not subject to the heightened 
scrutiny of Nollan’s “but-for,” “rational 
nexus” test, it still required some relation-
ship between the development and the 
harm caused.28 The court essentially ex-
plained that the “relationship between the 
private activity that gives rise to the exac-
tion and the public activity to which it is 
applied,” must be “founded on [an] actual, 
albeit indirect and general, impact.”29
Local governments sometimes “exact” 
the workforce or affordable housing set-
asides or fees at a stage too early in the 
land use development and permitting pro-
cess, thereby breaking the nexus between 
the approval at hand and the need for 
affordable housing. While certain legisla-
tive land use approvals, such as general 
plan amendments or rezonings, may be a 
necessary precedent to eventual land use 
and development, such early approvals 
rarely create the need or justification for 
exactions such as affordable housing. A 
local government imposing exactions for 
affordable housing at an early stage in the 
process, perhaps at the time of a rezone, 
without a specific development project 
and without the attendant analysis of the 
specific project’s contribution to the need 
for such affordable housing, is exacting 
property in violation of the takings clause 
of the U.S. Constitution and perhaps some 
state constitutions.30
ProPortionaLity
A second constitutional issue is this: 
Provided the regulation satisfies a nexus 
requirement, what reasonable percent-
age of affordable or workforce housing 
will meet the constitutional propor-
tionality test under Dolan v. Tigard 31 or 
similar proportionality requirements? As 
one commentator recently noted, “An 
inclusionary zoning ordinance deserves 
. . . judicial deference . . . provided that 
the program addresses a lack of afford-
able housing at a level proportionate to each 
development and it can be defended through 
sufficient planning by each municipality.”32 
While the Court in Dolan made 
it clear that mathematical precision 
was not required, there must be some 
quantitative effort to define the extent 
of the housing burden imposed by the 
proposed development and the propor-
tionate or fair share of that burden that 
should be borne by the developer. 
In a process similar to the more famil-
iar traffic impact study, data with respect 
to wages and earnings by employees at 
various types of developments are avail-
able and can be used to identify those 
potential employees that will have lim-
ited ability to participate in the housing 
market as it exists in the particular com-
munity. The result of such an analysis 
would be an estimate of the portion of 
anticipated employees unable to achieve 
market housing and the extent of that 
inability. Such data would be a sufficient 
basis for a set-aside or mitigation fee re-
quirement that is roughly proportional to 
the impacts of a particular development 
in a specific community. 
The importance of proportionality 
rivals nexus as an essential element of 
mitigation programs. Basing such pro-
grams on data and analysis tailored to 
the individual community is a strong 
basis for establishing that the Dolan 
proportionality requirement has been 
met while also demonstrating the nexus 
that is essential to Nollan. In states such 
as Virginia, explicit state authority is 
required for mandatory inclusion pro-
grams and neither nexus nor proportion-
ality will compensate for lack of such 
authorization. 
Though subsidiary issues remain 
open,33 compliance with state law as 
well as the bedrock Nollan and Dolan 
opinions are relatively settled legal 
guideposts. Because no magic bullet 
for increased affordable and workforce 
housing has been found, communities 
continue to experiment with methods 
to both effectively increase the number 
of such units and remain within these 
relatively well-defined statutory and 
constitutional boundaries.
CaSe StudieS: affordabLe houSing 
in affLuent areaS
Local government concern about af-
fordable housing is most prevalent in 
areas with high housing costs. These 
areas are commonly in resort or resort-
type locales where housing is de-
manded by buyers who do not derive 
their incomes or wealth from the local 
economy. When the income or wealth 
of housing buyers is substantially dif-
ferent from that typical within a local 
market, “unaffordable” prices can be 
expected, and this is frequently the 
case in resort-like locations. Local gov-
ernment affordable housing programs 
are commonly found in California, 
Rocky Mountain resort areas, and 
Florida and are particularly alive and 
well in two of the nation’s rapidly 
growing Sun Belt states: Florida and 
California. Most such programs provide 
for affordable housing in the range of 
20 to 25 percent of units constructed 
and are either incentive-based and not 
mandatory in nature or are based on 
nexus and proportionality studies.
fLorida
Affordable housing has long been a 
cause of concern for many jurisdictions 
in Florida. Many of the state’s resort 
communities, particularly those in the 
Florida Keys, have had to address the 
problems that result from the rising 
costs of land and homes as demand 
for vacation housing increased, lim-
ited supplies of land for development, 
and the need to provide housing to a 
workforce employed predominantly in 
lower wage tourist and service jobs. In 
response, several Florida communities 
have sought new tools to help fund and 
construct affordable workforce housing 
units. 
Basing such programs on data and analysis tailored to the 
individual community is a strong basis for establishing that the 
Dolan proportionality requirement has been met while also 
demonstrating the nexus that is essential to Nollan.
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Creating workforce housing in a 
Constrained growth Context
In the late 1990s, the City of Key West 
was one of the first communities to es-
tablish a mandatory inclusionary hous-
ing requirement. This program requires 
all new residential developments in 
Key West to set aside 30 percent of a 
project’s units as deed-restricted afford-
able housing. Developers were given 
alternatives to actually developing 
affordable housing units, including a 
$40,000 per affordable unit in-lieu fee; 
the fee has since increased to $200,000 
to better represent the local cost of 
housing. To offset the burden placed on 
developers to construct or pay for these 
new units, Key West originally provided 
a density bonus that allowed develop-
ers to produce more units than allowed 
under the base zoning district. This 
incentive is no longer available. The 
city also enacted, and has maintained, 
an Accessory Infill Units program that 
encourages and permits by-right the 
development of residential units on the 
second stories of commercial structures.
The success of Key West’s pro-
gram has been directly impacted by 
the Monroe County Rate of Growth 
Ordinance, administered locally as the 
Building Permit Allocation System. This 
system sets annual allocations for the 
number of new residential units that 
can be permitted, based on hurricane 
evacuation requirements, and sets out 
growth allocations for both affordable 
and market-rate units. This ordinance 
requires that “under no circumstances 
will the allocations for affordable hous-
ing constitute less than 30 percent of 
the total unit allocations made available 
since 1990.” Prior to the market down-
turn, approximately 140 units had been 
developed through this program. Likely 
due to the tenure of the program and the 
affordable housing requirements being 
tied to growth allocations, this program 
has been successful at developing more 
affordable units than any other inclusion-
ary housing program in Florida.
florida’s inclusionary housing Case Law
In 2005, Tallahassee established a vol-
untary inclusionary housing program 
that included a 25 percent density 
bonus incentive to developers of afford-
able units. The City Council encour-
aged developers to meet the demand 
for affordable housing by developing 
units under this voluntary program 
with the stipulation that the program 
would become mandatory if no units 
were produced. Within a year, no af-
fordable housing projects had been 
proposed, and the City Council passed 
a mandatory Inclusionary Housing 
Ordinance that applies to all new 
residential developments of 50 units or 
more. Tallahassee’s mandatory afford-
able housing set-aside for residential 
developments depends upon the type of 
project—10 percent for owner-occupied 
developments and 15 percent for rental 
developments. Tallahassee offers an in-
lieu fee mitigation option based on the 
median sales price of units in the de-
velopment, ranging from approximately 
$10,000 to $25,000 per affordable unit. 
Developers contested Tallahassee’s 
mandatory requirement in 2006 in 
Florida Home Builders Association, Inc. 
v. City of Tallahassee.34 In the trial court 
opinion issued in November 2007, the 
judge ruled that the inclusionary or-
dinance was valid “because it did not 
constitute a physical or regulatory taking 
of property without just compensation” 
and that it was “an exaction which is 
subject to the holdings of the Supreme 
Court in Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard.”35 
The Association appealed this deci-
sion, and it was dismissed as the court 
deemed the plaintiff to lack standing. 
Florida Home Builders stands today as 
precedent supporting inclusionary hous-
ing programs in Florida.
improving inclusionary housing  
Program flexibility 
Similar to Tallahassee, Palm Beach 
County enacted a voluntary inclusion-
ary housing program in 2004. When 
no affordable housing projects were 
proposed, the county created a manda-
tory Inclusionary Workforce Housing 
Program in 2006. The program is tai-
lored to the county’s regulatory context 
and provides multiple types of incen-
tives and regulatory relief measures de-
signed to offset the economic burden of 
the mandatory requirements. The ordi-
nance requires specific set-asides based 
on whether residential projects are lo-
cated in standard residential zoning dis-
tricts or in Planned Unit Developments 
(PUDs). Because developers have more 
flexibility in determining the building 
program and development standards 
under PUD zoning, the county decided 
that more affordable units should be 
required. PUDs provide an opportunity 
for project innovation and creative de-
sign that can result in the development 
of more affordable units. 
In 2010, Palm Beach County worked 
with members of the local development 
community to amend the original pro-
gram by providing more flexible options 
for developing workforce housing units 
and increasing incentives. Under the re-
vised program, builders must select one 
of three alternatives for developing units. 
The first option (full bonus/incentive) 
provides a higher percentage of required 
affordable units in combination with a 
higher density bonus option. A second 
option (limited bonus/incentive) requires 
a lower percentage of affordable units 
than the first option, with a commensu-
rate reduction in the density bonus, and 
requires that half of the workforce hous-
ing units meet affordability guidelines 
for households earning 60 to 80 percent 
of the area median income and half for 
households earning 80 to 100 percent of 
that amount. The third option, intended 
for affordable housing developers, re-
quired all project units to be affordable 
to workforce-income households. The 
first two options permit payment of an 
in-lieu development fee instead of af-
fordable housing construction, and the 
original fee has been reduced for rental 
units from $81,500 to $50,000. Originally, 
only 75 percent of units could be 
“bought out” with an in-lieu fee. Today, 
all units built under options one and two 
are eligible for buyout. 
Density bonus provisions are de-
pendent upon the zoning of the project 
and can permit as much as 100 percent 
greater density than allowed under the 
base zoning. Developers also can qualify 
for an additional density bonus through 
the county’s transfer of development 
rights program. Developments that are 
approved for a density bonus of 30 per-
cent or more must demonstrate that the 
affordable units will not be clustered 
Likely due to the tenure of the program and the affordable housing 
requirements being tied to growth allocations, [the Key West]
program has been successful at developing more affordable units 
than any other inclusionary housing program in Florida.
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Many other communities in Florida are considering development 
of comprehensive mitigation programs and have developed nexus 
studies to assess the extent to which new residential and nonresidential 
developments generate demand for new workforce housing.
and will be dispersed within a given 
sector of the county to ensure that so-
cioeconomic homogeneity in neighbor-
hoods is not a result of project design. 
In addition, bonus units must be located 
in close proximity to urban amenities 
such as transit, medical facilities, and 
employment opportunities, as well as 
provide access to social services. In ad-
dition to the density bonus provisions, 
developer incentives include relief from 
open space, parking, and landscaping 
development standards and from traffic 
concurrency requirements. 
Developers of workforce housing 
units are now provided a “release of 
obligation process” that provides relief 
should an affordable unit not sell within 
six months of being on the market. 
Provided the developer can prove that 
the unit meets eligibility requirements, 
including proof that marketing require-
ments were met and that 80 percent or 
more of the project’s market rate units 
have binding contracts, the developer 
can be released from the obligation of 
selling the unit as workforce housing, 
permitting them to sell it at a market 
price. The market sale price of that unit 
determines the release of obligation 
payment. Payment amounts are deter-
mined based on the difference between 
the market sale price and the workforce 
housing unit price. If the difference is 
less than $20,000, then the release of 
obligation payment is $10,000. If the dif-
ference is between $20,000 and $81,250, 
the payment is 50 percent of the differ-
ence. And if the difference is $81,250 or 
more, the payment is $40,750. Payments 
are made to the county’s Workforce 
Housing Trust Fund to assist with home 
buyer assistance programs. 
new approach: Comprehensive workforce 
housing Mitigation 
Islamorada (Village of Islands), located 
in the middle section of the Florida 
Keys, adopted the first comprehensive 
housing mitigation program in Florida in 
October 2007. The program is based on a 
nexus study that assesses the affordable 
and workforce housing needs of both 
residential and nonresidential develop-
ments. For residential development, 
the study demonstrates the relationship 
between the size of a home, in square 
feet of living area, being developed in 
Islamorada and the number of affordable 
workforce units demanded as a result of 
its development. The concept is based 
on employee generation—a larger home 
is shown to employ more low-wage earn-
ers who operate and maintain the home 
than a smaller home. In addition, homes 
that are used as vacation rentals and sec-
ond homes require more employees to 
operate and maintain the properties than 
homes owned by full-time occupants. 
As a result, the mandatory requirement 
for residential developments is based 
on the size and tenancy of the home 
and is provided as both a unit that must 
be constructed on- or off-site, as well as 
alternative forms of mitigation should 
the developer be unable to construct the 
unit. If the affordable housing require-
ment results in less than one afford-
able residential dwelling unit, then the 
Village will accept a fee in-lieu payment. 
Preference is given to construction of 
units, but if it is deemed impracticable 
to construct, developers can choose to 
satisfy the requirements by converting 
market-rate units to workforce housing 
through deed restrictions, conveying 
land to the Village for the development 
of workforce housing, paying an in-lieu 
fee, or some combination of these op-
tions. The Village provides additional 
incentives to offset the mitigation bur-
den by increasing the base densities for 
development of affordable units in most 
zoning jurisdictions and waiving building 
permit fees for affordable units.
To provide relief to developers of 
modestly scaled homes, units of less than 
1,000 square feet are exempted from the 
requirement, and homes in the 1,000 to 
2,000 square-foot range must mitigate 
based on a sliding scale. A developer of 
a 3,000-square-foot, full-time occupancy 
unit would be required to construct 
0.0441 of a unit or pay an in-lieu fee of 
$2,885; a developer of a 3,000-square-
foot second home or vacation rental unit 
would be required to construct 0.0513 
of a unit or pay $3,205. To be eligible for 
the full-time occupancy mitigation rate, 
developers must show valid documenta-
tion that verifies that new homes will be 
owned by full-time occupants.
The relationship between nonresiden-
tial development and the demand it cre-
ates for affordable workforce housing was 
also assessed. The study shows that there 
is a relationship between the type of land 
use (i.e., office, institutional, retail, indus-
trial, etc.) and the number of affordable 
workforce units needed to house lower 
wage employees. Because Islamorada’s 
economy is based in the tourist industry, 
tourist development was further broken 
down into new tourist development and 
expansion/redevelopment of existing 
tourist developments. New tourist devel-
opments were shown to demand more 
workforce units than expansions of exist-
ing facilities, because in most cases new 
developments will create more new jobs 
than expansion of existing developments. 
A developer of a new tourist development 
would be required to construct 0.00029 
of a unit or pay a mitigation fee of $25 
per square foot, and a developer of an 
expansion/redevelopment of an existing 
tourist use would be required to construct 
0.00019 or pay $16.45 per square foot of 
development. 
Many other communities in Florida 
are considering development of com-
prehensive mitigation programs and 
have developed nexus studies to assess 
the extent to which new residential and 
nonresidential developments gener-
ate demand for new workforce hous-
ing. Because of the housing market 
downturn, these efforts have been put 
on hold and will likely be resurrected 
when housing markets improve. While 
Tallahassee has set precedent for the 
adoption of inclusionary housing ordi-
nances, no such precedent has yet been 
set for comprehensive mitigation pro-
grams that require mandatory mitiga-
tion from residential and nonresidential 
developments that may include in-lieu 
fees. Florida communities are waiting 
to see if Islamorada’s comprehensive 
program will be contested and if the 
program will be upheld by state courts. 
Because the mitigation requirements 
are based upon statistical studies of lo-
cal housing prices, employment, and 
wages, and because the ordinance also 
provides an alternative mitigation calcu-
lation for unique developments that can 
demonstrate that the demand for work-
force housing created by the develop-
ment is less than the mitigation require-
ment published in the ordinance—the 
independent calculation for alternative 
mitigation—it is likely that the ordi-
nance would be upheld by the courts in 
the event of a challenge. 
CaLifornia
While several other states have had 
experience with inclusionary zoning 
and mandatory housing set-asides, 
California, in all likelihood, has the 
most comprehensive experience. 
“Affordable By Choice: Trends in 
California Inclusionary Housing 
Programs,” a study of housing pro-
duced through inclusionary hous-
ing programs between January 1999 
through June 2006 commissioned by 
the Non-Profit Housing Association 
of Northern California, the California 
Coalition for Rural Housing, the San 
Diego Housing Federation, and the 
Sacramento Housing Alliance, reported 
that nearly one-third of California juris-
dictions have inclusionary programs.36 
Among the report’s key findings: 
•  The jurisdictions producing the most 
inclusionary housing offer financial sub-
sidies; the most frequent source of local 
funds is redevelopment funding.37 
•  Density bonuses are “the sec-
ond most common incentive . . . of-
fered by half of the top-producing 
jurisdictions.”38
•  Permit-related incentives, offered for 
deferral, reduction, or waiving of permit 
and impact fees, are offered in most top-
producing programs.39
•  Eighty thousand Californians 
have housing through inclusionary 
programs.40
•  When market-rate developers work 
with affordable housing developers to 
meet their inclusionary requirement, 
the units are more likely to serve lower 
income households.41
California case law reflects a ten-
dency to question the legality of man-
datory set-asides without some sort of 
bonus, unless a nexus and proportion-
ality are readily apparent. Commercial 
Builders of Northern California v. City of 
Sacramento, where the Ninth Circuit 
held that a City of Sacramento ordi-
nance was constitutional under Nollan, 
is discussed above and further held that: 
We . . . agree with the City that Nollan 
does not stand for the proposition that 
an exaction ordinance will be upheld 
only where it can be shown that the 
development is directly responsible for 
the social ill question. Rather, Nollan 
holds that where there is no evidence 
of a nexus between the development 
and the problem that the exaction 
seeks to address, the exaction cannot be 
upheld. Where, as here, the Ordinance 
was implemented only after a detailed 
study revealed a substantial connection 
between development and the problem 
to be addressed, the Ordinance does not 
suffer from the infirmities that the Su-
preme Court disapproved in Nollan.42 
Also in Home Builders Association of 
Northern California v. City of Napa,43 the 
court upheld the City of Napa’s inclu-
sionary zoning ordinance requiring that 
10 percent of all newly constructed units 
must be affordable, but only after the city 
made significant findings and provided 
a 700-page report studying possible af-
fordable housing solutions, much like the 
City of Sacramento.44 Moreover, the court 
specifically recognized that not only did 
the City’s inclusionary zoning ordinance 
impose “significant burdens on those 
who wish to develop their property,”45 
it also provided “significant benefits to 
those who comply with its terms” such 
as “expedited processing, fee deferrals, 
loans or grants and density bonuses.”46 
Finally, the court found dispositive in this 
facial challenge to the ordinance that it 
contained an administrative relief clause 
that allowed for a complete waiver of the 
exclusionary requirements should the 
developer establish that the requirements 
were unconstitutional or unlawful.47
Moreover, this decision must be 
read in the context of California’s 
statutory, mandatory bonus require-
ments.48 The statute provides density 
bonuses for very low-income, low-income, 
and moderate-income set-asides as fol-
lows: (1) a 20 percent density bonus for 
developments that make five percent 
of units affordable to very low-income 
households, with density bonus in-
creases of two-and-a-half percent for 
each additional one percent increase of 
very low-income units;49 (2) a 20 percent 
density bonus for developments that 
make 10 percent of units affordable to 
low-income households, with density 
bonus increases of 1.5 percent for each 
additional one percent increase of low-
income units;50 and (3) a five percent 
density bonus for developments that 
make 10 percent of units affordable 
to moderate-income households, with 
increases of one percent for each addi-
tional one percent increase in moderate-
income units.51 Under California statute, 
maximum density bonuses peak at 
35 percent when a project provides 
11 percent very low-income units, 20 
percent low-income units, or 40 percent 
moderate-income units.52 
Furthermore, in at least one subse-
quent interpretation of the Napa Valley 
case, a California superior court held 
that where a city (San Diego, in that 
case) fails to provide for a review of the 
constitutionality of a housing set-aside 
as a ground for waiving it, the ordinance 
on its face is an unconstitutional tak-
ing.53 The court reasoned: 
[O]n its face, the ordinance does not 
provide for the granting of a waiver 
solely because of an absence of any 
reasonable relationship or nexus be-
tween the impact of the development 
and the exclusionary requirement. The 
City can, therefore, impose the exclusionary 
requirement on a development not reason-
ably related to the need for that requirement. 
Inasmuch as [this] does not allow the City 
to avoid the unconstitutional application 
of the ordinance, the ordinance on its face 
results in an unconstitutional taking.54
In one of the two most recent cases 
evaluating the legality of affordable 
housing requirements in California, the 
court concluded in Building Industry 
Association of Central California v. City 
of Patterson55 that an increased in-lieu 
housing fee was invalid and not “reason-
ably justified” because the fee did not 
bear any reasonable relationship to the 
project’s deleterious impact.56 The City 
of Patterson had adopted a resolution 
in 2006 setting the affordable housing 
in-lieu fee at $20,946 per new single-
family home based on a Fee Justification 
Study.57 The fee was calculated by divid-
ing the total cost to construct the afford-
able housing needed in the city (642 
units at a total cost of $73.5 million) by 
the estimated number of dwelling units 
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that remained to be constructed in the 
general plan area but had not yet ob-
tained entitlements (3,507).58 The court 
examined the city’s Fee Justification 
Study and “located nothing that demon-
strates or implies the increased fee was 
reasonably related to the need for afford-
able housing associated with the proj-
ect.”59 In a footnote, the court observed 
that if the “214 units in the Developer’s 
two subdivisions had been the only un-
entitled units” in the city, the city’s fee 
calculation method would have yielded a 
per-unit fee of $343,458.60 
Following this decision, the City of 
Patterson changed its fee structure to 
require builders to either provide 15 
percent of units as affordable or pay an 
amount that will fully fund the develop-
ment of the units. Also in response to 
Patterson, some cities are planning to 
revise their in-lieu fee and on-site inclu-
sionary requirements, while others have 
completed nexus studies to demonstrate 
there is a “reasonable relationship” be-
tween the affordable housing require-
ments and the “deleterious impact” of the 
project. Yet other cities have taken the po-
sition that their inclusionary in-lieu fees 
are distinguishable because of the unique 
fee calculation in Patterson and have cho-
sen not to amend their in-lieu fees. 
The second recent California case 
affecting affordable housing properties in 
California is Palmer/Sixth Street Properties, 
L.P. v. City of Los Angeles.61 In Palmer, the 
city adopted a specific plan requiring 
developers to provide low-income hous-
ing units subject to monthly rent limits. 
Developers were required to either 
provide low-income housing units or pay 
an in-lieu fee.62 The court reasoned that 
requiring a developer to provide afford-
able housing units at regulated rental 
rates (or to pay a fee in lieu of such re-
duced rental inclusionary units) in order 
to obtain project approval was “hostile 
or inimical” to an owner’s rights under 
the Costa-Hawkins Act.63 The court held 
that under the Act, when the owner of 
a residential property has not received 
a state or local subsidy, only the owner 
may establish the initial and subsequent 
rental rates.64 The Act, therefore, pre-
empted the specific plan and invalidated 
both the inclusionary requirement and 
the fee.65 Rejecting the city’s argument 
that the in-lieu fee should be upheld un-
der the statute’s severability clause, the 
court concluded the severability clause 
did not apply because the in-lieu fee pro-
vision was “inextricably intertwined with 
the invalid portion of the Plan’s afford-
able housing requirements.”66 The court 
reasoned, “[s]evering the invalid in-lieu 
fee provision from the invalid affordable 
housing requirements would serve no 
useful purpose.”67 
The Palmer decision does not affect 
inclusionary requirements applicable 
to for-sale units. As is the case with 
Patterson, cities have responded to 
Palmer in various ways. Some cities have 
chosen not to amend their inclusionary 
rental requirements in anticipation that 
Palmer might be reversed or addressed 
by legislative action. Other cities have 
temporarily suspended affordable hous-
ing requirements for new rental housing 
developments or amended the require-
ments by imposing impact fees per 
square foot, rather than based on the 
amount of in-lieu fees the city would 
require to provide the inclusionary units 
itself. However, under the impact-fee 
approach, cities are still required by 
Patterson to demonstrate a nexus be-
tween the fees imposed and the impact 
of the proposed development project. 
California Senate Bill 184, proposed 
by state senator Mark Leno in response 
to Palmer, seeks to amend the Costa-
Hawkins Act to clarify that the Act does 
not apply to inclusionary rental housing 
programs. If enacted and upheld in the 
event of legal challenge, this bill would 
undo the effects of Palmer and would 
make clear that requiring inclusionary 
housing or fees is a permissible land 
use power to be exercised by cities and 
counties in California. The bill would au-
thorize the legislative body of any city or 
county to adopt ordinances to establish, 
as a condition of development, inclusion-
ary housing requirements, as specified, 
and would declare the intent of the 
Legislature in adding this provision. 
However, the bill was refused passage 
on June 2, 2011, and ordered to inactive 
file on request of Senator Leno on July 1, 
2011.68 Whether the California legislation 
will revisit reversing Palmer or otherwise 
endorsing affordable housing require-
ments for nonsubsidized market-rate 
housing projects will not be known for at 
least a year, and perhaps many more.
ConCLuSion
This extensive experience with afford-
able and workforce housing programs 
in Florida and California is reflected 
in other jurisdictions, particularly in 
terms of the average rate of set-asides 
and the prevalence of density bonuses. 
However, it is not clear that such pro-
grams are an effective means of actually 
providing affordable housing. Perhaps 
the most current data is contained in a 
survey by urban planner Douglas Porter 
for the Urban Land Institute entitled 
Inclusionary Zoning for Affordable Housing, 
published in 2004. The author notes in 
his introductory materials that inclusion-
ary zoning is not a particularly productive 
or efficient way of approaching our na-
tional crisis in affordable housing. Thus, 
for example, the highly successful pro-
gram in Montgomery County, Maryland, 
produces only about eight percent of the 
total yearly addition to the county’s stock 
of affordable housing. In an oft-touted 
Boston program, of the 20,340 subsidized 
low-income housing units produced be-
tween 1990 and 1997, a mere 1,200 came 
from inclusionary zoning programs. The 
rest comes from various government-
subsidized housing programs. 
Additionally, inclusionary housing 
programs require tradeoffs. All the pro-
grams we surveyed provide some sort 
of bonus to developers who set aside 
part of their projects for affordable or 
workforce housing. Some examples of 
programs that provide bonuses: Fairfax, 
Virginia, 10 to 20 percent density bonuses, 
plus relaxed setback and yard require-
ments; Longmont, Colorado, up to 20 
percent density bonuses; Burlington, 
Vermont, 15 to 25 percent density bo-
nuses; Cambridge, Massachusetts, 15 
percent density bonuses; Somerville, 
Massachusetts, 20 percent density bo-
nuses; Ft. Collins, Colorado, negotiable 
density bonuses plus expedited or waived 
development processes; and Denver, 
cash payments ranging from $5,000 to 
$10,000 per affordable unit, plus negoti-
ated density bonuses. Other communities 
are reportedly even more generous with 
respect to bonuses and incentives for af-
fordable housing: Highland Park, Illinois, 
[I]nclusionary zoning is not a particularly productive or efficient 
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for example, permits one additional 
market-rate unit for each affordable unit 
constructed and waives building permit, 
sewer and water tap-in, and impact fees 
for affordable units. 
The recent sharp decline in housing 
demand and prices has lessened but by 
no means eliminated the need to address 
affordable and workforce housing. To 
date, most local, affordable housing ef-
forts have been inclusionary housing re-
quirements imposed on newly approved 
developments, most commonly as a per-
centage of total units authorized. Some 
of these requirements allow for options 
such as an in-lieu payment, and others 
provide various bonuses and incentives 
that at least partly alleviate the economic 
burden imposed on the developer. 
Additionally, many such requirements 
have been imposed ad hoc, that is, with-
out the passage of an ordinance. Rather, 
the requirements are simply written into 
a development order or agreement that 
accompanies the development approval. 
Evidence to date would suggest that the 
success of these inclusionary housing 
efforts has been modest.69
Inclusionary housing efforts are new 
for most jurisdictions. For many, their 
authority to impose such requirements on 
developers is not yet clear, and for most, 
the requirements to achieve constitution-
ality are unclear. The Supreme Court and 
many state courts have given clear guid-
ance with respect other forms of exactions. 
To the extent that affordable housing 
requirements are subjected to the same 
constitutional criteria, the nexus between 
the need for affordable housing and the 
development being assessed is, as Justice 
Scalia described it, “essential.” Moreover, 
the burden to provide affordable or work-
force housing to be imposed on a devel-
oper must be proportional to the impact of 
the development on the need for afford-
able and workforce housing, and many 
communities have based their efforts on 
studies that establish a nexus and achieve 
proportionality. As communities continue 
to experiment with improved means of af-
fordable housing delivery, there is a need 
for planners to continually survey these 
new efforts as new strategies are tested for 
effectiveness in the community and ac-
ceptance in the courts.
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